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Abstract
Over 200 bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments are currently in force, yet their impact
remains a topic of debate. We analyse effects of
27 agreements that are of particular impor-
tance for Australia on the value of merchan-
dise trade flows using data from 1970 up to the
global financial crisis in 2008. We show that
preferential trade agreements generally
increase trade between members but that there
are often offsetting negative effects on trade
with non-signatories. In contrast to regional
trading blocs and bilateral accords, agree-
ments more oriented towards open trade prin-
ciples have a positive impact on all trade flows
of member nations.
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1. Introduction
Since the early 1960s, the number of trade
agreements in force and notified to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has grown from
nine to almost 280, more than 200 of which
deal with merchandise trade. More than half of
these agreements have been finalised since
1990. In addition to the agreements notified to
the WTO, there are a substantial number of
other regional and bilateral agreements that
influence trade relations between countries
(for example, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) forum and agreements
between some members of the former Soviet
Union).1 As well as increasing in number, the
scope of agreements has expanded from focus-
ing on merchandise trade to including many
non-merchandise trade provisions.
The increasing number and overlapping
nature of these agreements has led to a signifi-
cant increase in the number of global
trading links potentially affected by such
arrangements—both directly (trade between
members) and indirectly (trade between
members and non-members). The growing
number and influence of bilateral and regional
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1. The WTO reports 204 notified agreements pertaining to
merchandise trade in- force in 2010, but this underesti-
mates the actual number of agreements in force as many
are not notified to the WTO. In 2006, there were at least
130 agreements not notified to the WTO (Medvedev
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trade agreements (BRTAs) warrants investiga-
tion of their impact on trade.
In this article, the effects of 27 trade agree-
ments on the value of merchandise trade flows
are examined using a comprehensive trade
database covering the period 1970 up to the
global financial crisis in 2008. The effects of
an agreement are assessed by comparing the
levels of trade before and after an agreement
entered into force, while controlling for other
determinants of trade. The analysis is intended
to shed light on the association between broad
BRTA design features and the significance and
direction of influence that these have on trade
flows. For example, it makes it possible to
draw a distinction between the effects of bilat-
eral or regional preferential arrangements
(such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and those more ori-
ented towards open or non-discriminatory
principles (such as the Association of South-
East Asian Nationals (ASEAN) and APEC). It
also indicates what type of agreement, short of
multilateral trade liberalisation under the aus-
pices of the WTO, is likely to yield greatest
economic benefits.
We make several contributions to the litera-
ture. First, we study a broad set of diverse
agreements using data on 140 countries. We
examine trade within trading blocks and BRTA
partners, but also trade between bloc members
and countries outside the trade agreement. We
include zero trade values in our model and use
a Poisson model to capture both zero and posi-
tive trade flows. Using fixed-effect panel data
techniques provides a flexible approach to the
incorporation of country-specific effects, and
we use country-pair dummies for both import
and export flows to allow for asymmetric trade
resistance. Panel data also allow us to account
for the timing and duration of trade agree-
ments. We use our results to categorise agree-
ments as inward/outward-looking depending
upon the balance of import and export effects
and breadth of coverage of agreement in terms
of the amount of trade that is captured within
the agreement.
We find that trade agreements, for the most
part, lead to increased trade. This increased
trade is mostly within BRTA member coun-
tries. For many agreements, this increased
trade with BRTA partners comes at the cost of
decreased trade with non-signatories to the
trade agreement. Trading blocks and bilateral
agreements appear to have diversionary trade
impacts whereas broad agreements to promote
trade and lower tariffs on a most favoured
nation basis appear to have beneficial trade
effects for countries both with other members
of the agreement and with countries outside
the agreement area.
We briefly review some of the previous
studies and their findings. We then present the
gravity model which provides the estimation
framework for our study and most of the pre-
vious studies. We preview the methodological
issues involved in the application of the gravity
model to the study of trade agreements. We
then present our data, estimation equation and
results. We summarise and conclude in the
final section.
2. Evidence on the Impact of Trade
Agreements
Early work on the impacts of preferential trade
agreements (the EEC and the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA)) by Aitken (1973)
suggested that agreements created trade in
early years but, in later years, were likely to
divert trade. (Trade diversion is when there is
no net increase in trade but where trade is
shifted from a country which is not a member
of the trade agreement to one which is.) Since
that time, a broad literature about the impact of
trade agreements has developed.
Studies of European-based agreements have
found evidence that BRTAs increase trade.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) examined
the EEC and EFTA agreements and found that
the impact on members changed over the life
of the agreements. Their examination of EFTA
found that overall it was trade creating while
the EEC created trade between members but
also had trade diversionary effects.
Sova and Sova (2009) found that bilateral
agreements between the European Union 15
and Central and Eastern European countries
were trade creating for the partners. Further,
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while not specifically modelling extra-group
effects, the authors found that the trade impor-
tance of the European Union for these Central
and Eastern European countries increased dra-
matically over the period of operation.
Carrere (2006) examined trade data for 130
countries over the period 1962 to 1996 to
explore the impact of eight regional trade
agreements—EEC, Andean, NAFTA, the
Central American Common Market (CACM),
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR),
ASEAN, EFTA and the Latin American Inte-
gration Association (LAIA).2 Carrere (2006)
found that overall, while agreements created
trade between members, they also had signifi-
cant trade diversionary impacts. The ASEAN
and LAIA agreements were found to be the
only agreements associated with extra-group
trade creation.
In a study of trade agreements between devel-
oping countries, Coulibaly (2009) found mixed
effects of trade creation between members and
non-members.All agreements examined, except
the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement,
were found to create trade between members.
However, as with other studies, the ASEAN
agreement was found to be associated with trade
creation both between members and between
members and non-members.
A number of studies have focused on the
US–Canada and NAFTA agreements. Clausing
(2001) examined the US–Canada trade agree-
ment using Harmonized System 10-digit US
import data. The study found that significant
intra-group trade creation was associated with
the formation of the agreement—intra-group
trade levels were estimated to be 26 per cent
higher than could be expected in the absence of
the agreement. Further, Clausing found no evi-
dence of trade diversion. USITC (U.S.
International Trade Commission) (2002) com-
pared Mexico’s import demand responsiveness
to tariff preferences and found that it increased
following the implementation of NAFTA. This
was associated with increased confidence
accompanying the NAFTA tariff cuts. Romalis
(2007) found that while both the US–Canada
and NAFTA agreements were associated with
increased trade between partners, trade diver-
sion was significant. In the case of NAFTA, the
significance of the estimated trade diversion
most likely resulted in a welfare loss for
Mexico. Coulibaly (2009) found that while
NAFTA was associated with increased trade
between members, it had mixed effects on
exports and imports between members and
non-members—imports from non-members
into the group increased, with exports from
members to non-members declining. Magee
(2008) finds important trade diversion effects
and finds, as we do, that controlling for fixed
effects reduces the estimated impacts of trade
agreements.
Adams et al. (2003) and Cipollina and
Salvatici (2010) are similar to this article in
exploring a wide range of agreements. Gener-
ally, the results obtained are consistent with
those above, with the most variation seen in
the extra-group effects. Of the agreements
examined, the ASEAN agreement is the only
one reported to be associated with both posi-
tive intra-group and extra-group effects
(APEC was not examined in these two papers).
Negative or mixed results on extra-group trade
are reported for the other agreements included
in the study. This suggests that the character-
istics of BRTAs themselves, the broader cir-
cumstances surrounding the introduction of
agreements and the composition of the mem-
bership have confounding influences on poten-
tial outcomes (World Bank 2005).
Our article is similar to recent studies by
Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Anderson and
Yotov (2011) and Bergstrand et al. (2013),
which all attempt to control for asymmetric
trade resistance effects between countries.
They do not study the same mix of countries
that we do, having a more European or Ameri-
can focus. They group some countries up into
a ‘rest of the world’ category in a way that does
not make sense for Australia and they do not
necessarily focus on the key trade agreements
for Australia. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find
much bigger effects of free trade than we do,
particularly for FTAs to which the United
States is a member. Bergstrand et al. (2013)
focus on the effect of country-pair specific
2. See Table 1 for notes on which countries are included
in which agreements.
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technological innovations and the possibility
that failure to account for these has biased
upwards the effect of free trade agreements
and the decline in the distance effect of inter-
national trade. Anderson and Yotov (2011), for
the most part, find similar size free trade effect
as we do.
We next discuss the gravity model that
forms the main estimating approach in the
papers discussed above. We then turn our
attention to several methodological issues
involved in implementing the gravity model
and then our data and results.
3. The Gravity Model of Trade
The gravity model allows the examination of
the effects of policies that affect trade, such as
trade agreements, while abstracting from other
causal influences. As implied by the name, the
gravity model is a model of trade flows based
on an analogy with the law of gravity in
physics—relating trade between two countries
to their size and the distance between them
(Anderson 1979). The gravity model has been
shown to be consistent with a number of theo-
retical models of international trade (see, for
example, Anderson & van Wincoop 2003).
The gravity model has its origins in early
work by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen
(1963) based on ‘ad hoc but intuitive
theorising’ (Deardorff 1984). In its simplest
form, the model explains exports (Xab) from
country a to country b in terms of their gross
domestic products (GDPs) (Ya, Yb), the dis-
tance between them (Dab) and other factors
affecting trade (cacb):
X c c
Y Y
D
ab a b
a b
ab
f
= ( ) ( )
α β
(1)
Taking the log-linearised form allows
parameter estimates to be obtained using ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and other economet-
ric estimation techniques [where the constant
c = ln(cacb)]:
ln ln ln lnX c Y Y f Dab a b ab( ) = + ( ) + ( ) − ( )α β
(2)
This simple model can be augmented by
including variables to capture supply condi-
tions at the origin, demand conditions at the
destination, and other effects on trade.
4. Methodological Issues
Findings from the studies reviewed above
vary somewhat based upon methodological
approaches. In this section, we highlight
several important methodological issues in the
application of the gravity model to understand-
ing the effect of trade agreements. In the
variable definition and model specification
sections below, we explain in detail how we
address these methodological issues in this
article.
Early papers used cross-sectional data and
suffered from omitted variable bias due to
unobservable country-specific effects. In par-
ticular, it is important to control for trade costs
and resistance to trade at the country level.
These are not easily captured through observ-
able data. Once panel data are available, fixed
effects estimation allows controlling for unob-
servable country-specific effects and allows
those effects to be correlated with observed
covariates. It also allows for country pair
dummies (as in Carrere 2006) or asymmetric
effects between countries depending upon
which country is importing and which is
exporting (as we use in this article). Panel data
also allow for the timing of trade agreements
to be studied.
Fixed effects estimation does not allow for
the estimation of time-invariant effects (such
as being land locked.) If such variables are of
interest, the fixed effects vector decomposition
as used by Sova and Sova (2009) provides one
solution.
The treatment of zero values in trade data
between countries has been shown to have a
material impact on results. Again, early papers
used ordinary least squares despite a large per-
centage of zeros values and truncation from
below at zero. (Carrere 2006 uses a linear
panel model, for example.) Adams et al.
(2003) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2004)
tested the appropriateness of alternative esti-
mators in the presence of zero trade flows.
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They suggested that the Tobit estimator is
superior to OLS. The Tobit estimator assumes
a truncated normal distribution and various
authors (Liu 2007; Burger et al. 2009;
Westerlund & Wilhelmsson 2009) have argued
that this does not fit the data. Burger et al.
(2009) compare OLS, Poisson, zero-inflated
Poisson, negative binomial and zero-inflated
negative binomial and show that results can
vary widely depending upon how zero values
are treated. They argue for the two Poisson
models.
A related issue is how to treat zero trade
values in a model where variables are specified
in logs. Some early papers either dropped all
the zeros or replaced the zeros with small posi-
tive values. Helpman et al. (2008) showed that
studies that discard bilateral trade links for
which no trade occurs are likely to derive
biased results as a consequence. They argued
that by focussing solely on bilateral trade links
where trade always occurs, biases downwards
the estimated effect of trade barriers because it
is the barriers which act as constraints at the
extensive margin (stopping the development of
new trade flows) that are the most costly.
Burger et al. (2009) show that dropping zeros
or replacing them with small values both can
heavily influence results and introduce large
bias in estimates.
In this article, we use panel data and a
Poisson model with fixed effects and model
trade values in levels allowing inclusion of
zeros in estimation. We allow for trade resis-
tance to be asymmetric—that is the fixed effect
for trade from country a to country b are
allowed to be different than the fixed effect for
trade from country a to country b. The two
weaknesses of our approach are: first, that the
fixed effects assume that country pair-specific
trade resistance is constant over time. Novy
(2013) suggests that this assumption may be
flawed in some circumstances; see also
Bergstrand et al. (2013). We prefer our specifi-
cation to an alternative one which would
involve parametrically specifying an adjust-
ment process over time for changing trade
resistance. The second weakness is that the
Poisson model assumes that the same underly-
ing economic process generates zero and posi-
tive trade values. Burger et al. (2009) argue that
one may want to try and model trade/no trade as
a separate process and then positive values of
trade for those countries that trade in a hurdle
model set-up. One problem with this approach
is finding variables which can identify the pres-
ence or absence of trade but which don’t influ-
ence the amount of trade and vice versa. Below,
we discuss a variety of sensitivity tests by
which we attempt to see how much our results
are influenced by these two assumptions.
Next, we discuss our data, variable con-
struction and model implementation.
5. Data, Agreement Coverage and
Variable Definitions
5.1 Data Used
We use trade data covering 140 countries taken
from the United Nations Comtrade database3
for the period 1970 up to the global financial
crisis in 2008. Total trade, in thousands of
current US dollars, for all available countries
in both the import and export direction was
used.
Using all available data means that some
bilateral links (for example, trade between
Australia and the United States) have up to
four recorded trade flows for a particular year
(exports to Australia and imports from Austra-
lia, reported by the United States, and vice
versa), while others may only have one
(imports to Bermuda from Kazakhstan,
reported by Kazakhstan). Where both trade
partners report some trade, they rarely, if ever,
report the same value. This is a well-known
feature of international trade data (Feenstra
et al. 2005).
Some studies seek to rationalise these
reported differences by removing observations
which do not match (for example, only use
trade flows reported by the importer). In
practice, this can remove up to half of the
observations. We retain all available trade
flow information. We adopt an asymmetric
structure for the fixed effects (detailed below)
that allows flows reported by both the importer
3. See http://comtrade.un.org/.
Barbalet et al.: Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 5
© 2015 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd
and the exporter to be included, without
excluding any observations. As a sensitivity
test, we re-estimated our models using only
importer-provided data and again using only
exporter-provided data. The main conclusions
of our study are unaffected.
5.2 Agreement Coverage
A total of 27 agreements have been included
in this study (Table 1). The agreements
were chosen for inclusion on the basis that
either:
Table 1 Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements (BRTAs) Membership and Dynamics
Agreement Countries included in the group† Date
APEC Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Philippines, USA, Singapore, Thailand; Chile (from 1994); China and Hong
Kong, China (from 1991); Mexico, Papua New Guinea (from 1993); Peru,
Russian Federation, Vietnam (from 1998)
1989
ASEAN-CEPT Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand; Lao PDR, Myanmar,
Vietnam (from 1997)
1992
ANZCERTA Australia, New Zealand 1983
Australia–PNG Australia, Papua New Guinea 1977
SPARTECA Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, PNG, Solomon Islands 1981
EEC 27 Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; United Kingdom,
Denmark, Ireland (from 1973); Greece (from 1981); Spain, Portugal (from
1986); Austria, Finland, Sweden (from 1995); Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic
(from 2004); Bulgaria, Romania (from 2007)
1958
EEC–Poland EEC, Poland 1994–2003
EEC–Romania EEC, Romania 1995–2006
EEC–Swiss EEC, Switzerland 1973
EEC–Egypt EEC, Egypt 1978
EFTA Norway, Switzerland; Austria (to 1995); Denmark, United Kingdom (to 1972);
Portugal, Sweden (to 1985); Finland (from 1986 to 1995); Iceland (from 1970)
1960
EFTA–Hungary EFTA, Hungary 1993–2003
EFTA–Poland EFTA, Poland 1992–2003
EFTA–Israel EFTA, Israel 1992
CEFTA Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia (and its successor states) (to 2004); Slovenia
(from 1996 to 2006); Romania (from 1997 to 2006); Bulgaria (from 1999 to
2003); Croatia (from 2003); Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova,
Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo (from 2007)
1994
US–Canada United States, Canada 1989–1993
NAFTA United States, Canada, Mexico 1994
Andean Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela; Peru (from 2006) 1994
CACM Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador 1993
LAIA Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Venezuela; Cuba (from 1999)
1980
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 1991
Bolivia–Mexico Bolivia, Mexico 1995
Costa Rica–Mexico Costa Rica, Mexico 1995
Chile–Colombia Chile, Colombia 1993
Group of three Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 1995
Bolivia–MERCOSUR Bolivia, MERCOSUR 1996
Chile–MERCOSUR Chile, MERCOSUR 1996
†GDP data availability may mean that not every country is included in the regression analysis.
ANZCERTA, Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Agreement; APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation; ASEAN,
Association of South-East Asian Nationals; CACM, Central American Common Market; CEFTA, Central European Free
Trade Agreement; CEPT, Common Effective Preferential Tariff; EEC, European Economic Community; EFTA, European
Free Trade Association; LAIA, the Latin American Integration Association; MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur;
NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement; PNG, Papua New Guinea; SPARTECA, South Pacific Regional Trade
and Economic Co-operation Agreement.
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• Australia is a member (Australia New
Zealand Closer Economic Agreement
(ANZCERTA), Australia–Papua New
Guinea (PNG), South Pacific Regional
Trade and Economic Co-operation Agree-
ment (SPARTECA) and APEC)
• they are likely to affect trade flows of Aus-
tralia or its major trading partners (including
the EEC, EFTA, ASEAN and NAFTA) or
• they are representative of a cross-section of
BRTAs (including agreements involving the
EEC and third countries and agreements
involving Central and South American coun-
tries such as CACM, MERCOSUR and
Chile–MERCOSUR).
The sample covers a variety of different
agreement styles. This covers a wide range
including: bilateral and regional preferential
agreements with varying external tariffs (such
as ANZCERTA and NAFTA); agreements with
a common external tariff (that is, customs
unions such as the EEC); non-reciprocal
agreements with a development focus (such as
Australia–PNG and SPARTECA); and non-
preferential agreements based on open region-
alism (APEC).
5.3 Variable Definitions
Trade flows are influenced by a number of
factors. Broadly, these factors can be
categorised into two groups:
• country-specific determinants of trade—
country characteristics such as their size,
relative income, consumer tastes and level of
development
• trade agreement related characteristics—
including whether or not a country has
been part of regional or bilateral trade
agreement(s).
5.3.1 Determinants of Trade
5.3.1.1 Economic Size In its simplest form,
the gravity model of trade specifies that trade
flows increase as the GDPs of the trading part-
ners increase. GDP can be seen as an indicator
for the levels of demand (importing country)
and supply (exporting country).
The specification we use follows Adams
et al. (2003), who reviewed the theory and
applicability of a number of ‘size variables’
and selected three variables—the sum of bilat-
eral GDPs, the absolute differences in GDP per
capita and the similarity in country size
between the country pairs. They noted that
these variables captured not only the aggregate
size of the trading partners but also the expen-
diture capabilities and taste preferences of
each partner.
GDP and GDP per capita are taken from
the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors and matched to the bilateral trade flow
data so that the bilateral trade flow observa-
tions include GDP and GDP per capita for both
importer and exporter. Current price GDP in
US dollars is used, matching the current US
dollar valuation of the dependent variable.
This avoids the potential biases inherent with
using price indices as identified by Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006).4
The three GDP-related variables for coun-
tries a and b (a ≠ b) in year t are the:
• log of sum of GDPs to represent the overall
size of the trading partners (SGDP)
ln GDP GDPat bt+( )
• log of absolute differences in GDP to repre-
sent the similarity of the trading partners
(SIMILARITY)
ln 1
2 2
−
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
GDP
GDP GDP
GDP
GDP GDP
at
at bt
bt
at bt
• difference of the logs of GDP per capita to
represent relative incomes between trading
partners (REL_INC)
abs GDP C GDP Cat btln ln ._ _( ) − ( )[ ]
4. In our study, the time dummies are sensitive to a change
in GDP valuation (for example, constant price valuation).
The trade agreements dummies are not affected much.
This could be due to the year dummy variables ‘soaking
up’ some of the variability in valuation (a price effect).
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Although correlated with one another,
these three GDP variables pick up slightly dif-
ferent effects. If we estimate the model three
times using each of these variables individu-
ally, our main results about free trade agree-
ments are unaffected. We prefer the model
with all three.
5.3.1.2 Resistance to Trade—Distance and
Other Factors Trade flows between two coun-
tries are expected to be smaller as the ‘eco-
nomic’ distance between them increases. For
example, to the extent that geographical dis-
tance is a proxy for transfer costs, two coun-
tries geographically close to each other will
trade more than two identical countries which
are further apart. However, a number of other
factors contribute to economic distance that
more fully embody the costs associated with
trading with other countries. Such other factors
may include:
• transport prices (port, rail and air
infrastructure)
• quarantine procedures
• consumer tastes, language, cultural heritage
and
• geography, for example whether a country is
landlocked or an island.
Many studies using the gravity model of
trade include a number of dummy variables to
control for these factors. Soloaga and Winters
(2001), for example, include variables to indi-
cate if the pair of countries share a border, share
a language, or if either or both are islands.
However, controlling for these factors
using observable variables introduces the risk
of omitted variable bias, as it is unlikely that
all relevant characteristics will be included.
This is further complicated as some economic
factors affecting trade flows are inherently dif-
ficult to measure or are unobservable (for
example, a preference for products made in a
neighbouring country, efficiency in customs
clearance, domestic policies and macroeco-
nomic conditions). While difficult to measure
and control for, these factors may still have a
systematic influence on trade between coun-
tries. Trade patterns may also be influenced by
military purchases, unusual production con-
centrations (such as crude oil) and non-
economic factors such as wars, bans, and
political and cultural relationships.
In addition, controlling for these country-
specific effects individually imposes the
restriction that the country-specific factors
affect trade in a uniform manner across all
countries. Relaxing this assumption, Cheng
and Wall (2005) applied symmetric country
pair fixed effects. These fixed effects replace
all time-invariant country-pair specific factors
such as distance and adjacency, and control for
all country-pair time-invariant specific effects
that affect trade flows. This reduces the risk of
omitted variable bias. While this approach
removes the restriction that such factors affect
trade uniformly for all countries, in assuming
that the effects are constant over time, it only
captures the average effect over the sample
period. Such country-pair fixed effects assume
that the unobserved factors affecting trade are
symmetric in nature—that is, they affect
exports from country A to country B in the
same way as they affect imports from country
B to country A.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive
theoretical foundations for the gravity model
of trade and provide an important insight into
the determinants of trade flows: that trade
between two countries depends on the cost of
trading between the two countries relative to
the cost of each country trading with its other
trading partners. They noted that in the
absence of explicit multilateral resistance
terms (which are not readily available),
country-specific fixed effects provide consis-
tent estimates of model parameters. Relaxing
the assumption of symmetric fixed effects,
asymmetric time-invariant country-pair fixed
effects are specified in this study. (Trade resis-
tance in flow from A to B may differ from that
for flow from B to A.) This approach is con-
sistent with the asymmetric nature of the
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) multilat-
eral resistance terms.
However, the use of time-invariant fixed
effects has some drawbacks. Novy (2013)
notes that using time-invariant fixed effects
(versus time-varying fixed effects) as a proxy
for multilateral resistance may introduce
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misspecification, the level of which depends
on the degree to which multilateral resistance
of a particular country changes over the time
period of interest. For some countries (for
example, the United States), he finds that mul-
tilateral resistance does not change signifi-
cantly over the period 1970–2000, but for
other countries (for example, Korea), he finds
that multilateral resistance does vary
substantially.
While this limitation remains in this study,
the sensitivity of results to the choice of dif-
ferent time period (and therefore the assump-
tion of time-invariant multilateral resistance) is
tested by estimating the model for different
time periods. These sensitivity tests indicated
that the coefficients on variables were gener-
ally stable across subsamples, indicating that
asymmetric time-invariant fixed effects
provide a suitable proxy for time-varying mul-
tilateral resistance in this analysis.
5.3.1.4 Time Dummy Variables Given the
potential for global events to influence the
level of trade of all countries, both positively
(for example, completion of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations) and negatively
(for example, global financial disruptions),
year dummy variables are included. These
capture annual changes in the levels of trade
common to all countries.
5.4 Trade Agreements and Related
Characteristics
Typically, the impact of trade agreements on
trade flows is examined by adding bilateral
or regional trade agreement-specific binary
dummy variables to the augmented gravity
model. Aitken (1973), one of the earliest
studies to apply the gravity model, specified a
single dummy variable to capture the changes
in trade between members of the EU and
EFTA, respectively.
Later work, for example Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1995), added a second dummy
variable to estimate the additional effect of
changes in trade (imports and exports) from
members of an agreement to countries not
party to the agreement.
Soloaga and Winters (2001) extended the
two dummy variable approach with a third
dummy variable in order to differentiate the
additional effects of a trade agreement on
imports to members (from members and non-
members) and on exports from members (to
members and non-members). They suggested
that the effect of a trade agreement may have
asymmetric effects on exports and imports.
Following Carrere (2006), a modified
version of the Soloaga and Winters (2001),
three dummy variable approach is used in this
study, where the second and third dummy vari-
ables exclude trade with members. This allows
the estimation of the effects of a trade agree-
ment on three categories of trade flows:
• trade between members
• imports to members from non-members and
• exports from members to non-members.
Dummy variables provide a broad indication
of the effect of trade agreements on trade: they
capture a common change in trade flows, irre-
spective of whether the change is due to lower
tariffs or other factors associated with an agree-
ment which influence trade. These dummies are
not interacted with time dummies so we are
picking up the average effects across the time
period covered by the agreement. Any common
changes in levels of trade that are not related to
other factors controlled for by the model, and
that persist over the period of the agreement,
are captured by the dummy variables and are
thus included in the ‘trade-agreement effect’.
6. The Empirical Model
The gravity model used in this study takes the
form:
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That is, estimated trade flows between
country a and country b (a ≠ b), denoted as i,
in year t, depend on the log of the sum of GDPs
of country a and b (SGDP), the log of the
similarity of the size of each country’s
economy (SIMILARITY) and the relative
incomes in each country (REL_INC). k indexes
trade agreements.
Our model could be developed directly from
a version of the gravity model of equation (2)
combined with a precise model of the relation-
ship between free trade agreements and bilat-
eral trade flows. This is the approach taken by
Bergstrand et al. (2013) using the gravity
equation derived by Arkolakis et al. (2012).
Equation (3) that we estimate is consistent
with an approach of this type.
The coefficient on D1k represents the esti-
mated impact (time invariant) of membership
of BRTA k on flows between member countries
(intra-group). The coefficients on D2k and D3k
represent the estimated impact (time invariant)
of BRTA membership on imports and exports,
respectively, between members and non-
members (extra-group).
The time dimension on the D1, D2 and D3
variables indicates that BRTA membership is
allowed to vary over the sample period. Time
dummies (T) and an asymmetric country-pair
fixed effect (αi) control for changes in the
global level of trade from year to year and the
average asymmetric multilateral trade resis-
tance between countries over the sample
period, respectively.
The Poisson probability function takes the
form:
Pr
!
Y y x
e
y
i i
i
y
i
i i
=( ) =
−λ λ
(4)
That is, each observation of the dependent
variable yi is distributed under a Poisson
distribution with parameter λi related to the
independent variables xi. The most common
formulation for λi is the log-linear formulation
ln λ βi ix= ′ and it follows that the expected
value of the dependent variable is given
by
E y x xi i i[ ] = ′( )exp β (Green 2008).
It can be shown that the estimated coeffi-
cients from the Poisson model are semi-
elasticities or proportional changes:
∂ [ ]
∂
=
ln E y x
x1
1β (5)
The standard Poisson estimator assumes
that zero trade flows in the data are produced
by the same ‘data generating process’ as the
non-zero trade flows. However, some studies
suggest the usefulness of the Poisson model
may be limited in the presence of a large
number of zero trade flows. Martin and Pham
(2008) and Burger et al. (2009), for example,
caution against using the Poisson estimator in
the presence of a large proportion of zero trade
flows (around 50 per cent).
In our data, 29 per cent of the observations
are zero trade flows. We estimate the model
with all the observations. We also estimate the
model dropping those country pairs which
record zero trade flows in every year of our data.
This reduces the percentage of zero trade flows
to 23 per cent. Results of these two approaches
are nearly identical. In the results section below,
we report the results for the latter approach.
7. Estimated Effects of Individual
Agreements
The specification of the model and the avail-
ability of comprehensive trade data means it is
possible to separately estimate within agree-
ment and net effects on global trade for each
agreement analysed. The different agreement
types can also be classified by reference to the
level of trade between members (trade orien-
tation) and the impact of agreement on trade
between members and trade between members
and non-members.
7.1 Intra-Agreement Effects
The individual effects of the 27 agreements are
shown in Figure 1. The estimated effects on
trade between members (in proportional
change terms) range from 0.378 for the EFTA–
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Israel agreement to 1.367 for the Bolivia–
Mexico agreement.5
Of the 27 agreements, 22 were estimated to be
associated with higher bilateral trade between
members (intra-group trade) than would other-
wise prevail. Although the magnitudes of the 22
positive estimates vary, the results are in line
with a priori expectations of the effect of lower-
ing barriers to merchandise trade.
For five agreements, however, it was esti-
mated that the formation of the agreement was
associated with lower levels of trade between
members than would otherwise be expected.
The five agreements are:
• The EEC–Switzerland Association Agree-
ment, in operation since 1973 The agree-
ment served as an alternative to full Swiss
membership of the EU.
• The EEC–Egypt Association Agreement,
signed in 1978. The agreement provided a
basis for the gradual liberalisation of trade
and set out the conditions for economic,
social and cultural cooperation between the
European Union and Egypt. The agreement
included a range of non-trade objectives
(such as adherence to democratic principles
and fundamental rights).
• The EFTA–Poland agreement, in force for
approximately 10 years prior to Poland
joining the EEC in 2004.
• The EFTA–Israel agreement, entered into
force in 1993.
• The MERCOSUR–Bolivia agreement,
entered into force in 1996.
In the case of the EEC–Switzerland agree-
ment, the negative result could be related to
the expansion of the EEC, and the declining
importance of trade with Switzerland for the
newer members of the expanded EEC. This
result is confirmed in the raw data. Since
1973, the EEC has grown in importance as a
share of Switzerland’s total trade, but the
share of trade with Switzerland as a total of
EEC trade declined from 1.03 per cent to
0.76 per cent. For the other agreements, the
cause of the negative intra-group trade effect
is not clear.
The estimates in Figure 1 are presented as
changes proportional to the level of trade
between the members of each agreement—the
5. Coefficients should be interpreted as an approximation
of the estimated proportional change in trade flows follow-
ing the formation of a trade agreement, holding other
factors fixed.
Figure 1 Estimated Effects of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreement (BRTA) Groupings on Intra-Group
Flows
Note: Estimated proportional change on trade between members, share of members total trade.
Source: Gravity model estimates and UN Comtrade database. All coefficient results from gravity model are significant at
the 1 per cent level.
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height of the bars should not be compared
across agreements as indicating something
about total trade flow.
7.2 The Net Effect of Agreements on Global
Trade
While the impact of agreements on trade
between partners is of interest, of greater
policy importance is the impact of agreements
on global trade after account is taken of intra-
bloc and extra-bloc effects. The estimated net
impacts of trade agreements on global trade
are presented in Table 2, with selected agree-
ments shown in Figure 2.
The effects are presented using global trade
flows as a common denominator allowing for
comparison of components and comparison
across agreements.6
The largest impact estimated was for intra-
group trade among members of the EEC.
6. The effect on world trade is shown as the estimated
proportional change in trade flows (dummy variables D1,
D2 and D3) multiplied by the level of trade covered by
those flows. The base is taken as the counterfactual—trade
levels without the estimated effects of the 27 BRTAs.
Table 2 Estimated Effect of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements (BRTAs) on Global Trade, 2008†
Agreement
Intra-group: Imports
and exports
Extra-group: Imports
to the group
Extra-group: Exports
from the group
% change % change % change
APEC (1989) 2.54 1.60 1.88
ASEAN–CEPT (1992) 0.60 0.67 1.42
ANZCERTA (1983) 0.01 −0.12 −0.23
AU–PNG (1977) 0.00 0.08 −0.24
SPARTECA (1981) 0.01 −0.07 −0.28
EEC (1958) 10.65 1.17 0.73
EEC–Poland (1994–2003)† 0.17 −0.04 −0.03
EEC–Romania (1995–2006)† 0.22 0.01 0.00
EEC–Swiss (1973) −0.10 −0.06 −0.03
EEC–Egypt (1978) −0.04 0.08 0.03
EFTA (1960) 0.01 0.33 0.16
EFTA–Hungary (1993–2003)† 0.00 0.12 0.10
EFTA–Poland (1992–2003)† −0.00 −0.03 −0.12
EFTA–Israel (1993) −0.01 −0.02 0.06
CEFTA (1994) 0.01 0.06 0.02
US–Canada (1989–93)† 0.72 0.41 0.26
NAFTA (1994) 2.49 0.85 −1.71
Andean (1994) 0.09 0.04 0.16
CACM (1993) 0.00 0.12 −0.00
LAIA (1980) 0.28 −0.28 1.27
MERCOSUR (1991) 0.30 0.29 −0.13
Bolivia–Mexico (1995) 0.00 1.38 0.43
Costa Rica–Mexico (1995) 0.01 0.08 0.83
Chile–Columbia (1993) 0.00 0.20 −0.15
Group of three (1995) 0.01 −0.88 −0.37
MERCOSUR–Bolivia (1996) −0.00 −0.01 −0.01
MERCOSUR–Chile (1996) 0.03 −0.05 0.17
†The effects of five agreements not operational in 2008 are estimated for the final year of operation. All estimated BRTA
effects in this table are significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Gravity model estimates and authors’ calculations.
ANZCERTA, Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Agreement; APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation; ASEAN,
Association of South-East Asian Nationals; CACM, Central American Common Market; CEFTA, Central European Free
Trade Agreement; CEPT, Common Effective Preferential Tariff; EEC, European Economic Community; EFTA, European
Free Trade Association; LAIA, the Latin American Integration Association; MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur;
NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement; PNG, Papua New Guinea; SPARTECA, South Pacific Regional Trade
and Economic Co-operation Agreement.
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Major positive impacts are estimated for the
ASEAN–Common Effective Preferential
Tariff (CEPT) and APEC, while the different
effects across components estimated for
NAFTA on global trade indicate that, in some
cases, a positive effect on trade within the
group could be substantially offset by lower
exports to countries outside the group. In rela-
tion to ANZCERTA, the results suggest that
while the agreement is likely to have increased
trans-Tasman trade, this is offset by a negative
impact on trade with non-members.
8. Differences between Agreement Types
To contrast agreement types, the effect of agree-
ment formation on the ‘trade orientation’ of
members was analysed. This analysis focuses on
the extent of trade between members relative to
non-members and how that has changed. We
characterise trade orientation of an agreement by
a comparison of two measures:
• ‘trade coverage’ of an agreement which
measures the average share of trade between
members (intra-group trade) in the total
trade of members as a ratio of the share of
trade between members and non-members
(extra-group trade) in that trade and
• ‘balance of effects’ of an agreement which
measures the estimated net effect of an
agreement on trade between members (the
intra-group effect) as a ratio of the estimated
net effect on trade between members and
non-members (the extra-group effect)
(Box 1).
Using these measures, agreements are
characterised as either ‘neutrally oriented’,
‘inwardly orientated’, or ‘outwardly oriented’.
If the balance of effects is proportional to the
trade orientation of members, an agreement
can be characterised as neutrally oriented. If,
on the other hand, the change in trade between
members is estimated to be greater than would
be expected given the trade orientation of
members, an agreement can be characterised
as inwardly oriented while if less than can be
expected, an agreement can be characterised as
outwardly oriented.
The trade orientation of 11 of the larger agree-
ments examined is shown in Figure 3. A general
trend in the results is that as relative importance
of intra-group trade increases (trade coverage,
estimated by the ratio of intra-group trade to
extra-group trade), so does the relative impor-
tance of projected changes in intra-group trade
(balance of effects, estimated by the ratio of
estimated intra-group to extra-group effects).
That is, agreements that cover a greater amount
of their members’ trade are generally more
‘inward orientated’ with agreements associated
with augmentation of within-area trade.
Figure 2 Estimated Effects of Selected Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements (BRTAs) on
Global Trade, 2008†
†The base used to compute the proportional change is the estimated trade levels in the absence of any BRTA.
Source: Gravity model estimates.
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This pattern is particularly evident for the
cases of MERCOSUR, the United States–
Canada agreement and NAFTA–EEC agree-
ment. For example:
• the trade coverage ratio of the MERCOSUR
agreement was 0.11 while its balance of
effects ratio was 1.87
• the trade coverage ratio of the United States–
Canada agreement was 0.22 with a balance
of effects ratio of 1.09
• the NAFTA agreement has a trade coverage
ratio of 0.39 but a balance of effects ratio of
negative 2.91 (the negative indicates the esti-
mated change in intra-group trade is in the
opposite direction to extra-group trade)
and
• the second largest agreement examined was
the EEC, with a trade coverage ratio of 0.45
and a balance of effects ratio of 5.61.
In relation to Asia-Pacific regional agree-
ments, the design of the agreements
leaned more towards open regionalism, so
one would expect these agreements to be
neutral or outward oriented. In the case of the
ASEAN–CEPT agreement, the trade cover-
age ratio of the ASEAN–CEPT agreement
was 0.15 but its balance of effects ratio was
only 0.29. Although inwardly oriented, it is
relatively close to the ‘neutral’ line in
Figure 3.
For APEC, the level of trade between
members was approximately the same as the
Box 1 Characterising the trade orientation of an agreement
To determine the trade orientation of an agreement, two measures—the ‘trade coverage’ ratio
and ‘balance of effects’ ratio—are derived.
• The trade coverage ratio (x) of each agreement provides a benchmark indicator of how
important trade between the members of an agreement is as a share of their total trade.
— It is computed as the average ratio of the actual levels of intra-group trade to extra-group
trade for the years in which the agreement was in force over the period 1970 to 2008.
— A ratio of greater than one indicates that trade between the members of the agreement
comprises more than half of the agreement members’ total trade, that is, the level of
intra-bloc trade exceeds that of extra-bloc trade.
• The balance of effects ratio (y) of each agreement indicates the size of the estimated net
effect of the agreement on trade between members relative to its estimated net effect on trade
between members and non-members.
— It is computed as the ratio of the estimated net intra-group effect on global trade in
percentage points to the net extra-group effect on global trade.
— A ratio of greater than one indicates that the agreement is estimated to have had a larger
effect on trade between members than it is to have had on trade between members and
non-members. A ratio of less than one indicates it had a lesser effect.
— A negative ratio indicates that the direction of the estimated change in intra-group trade
is offset by the estimated change in extra-group trade, either towards more outward
oriented trade (intra-group effect negative, extra-group effect positive) or more inward
oriented (intra-group effect positive, extra-group effect negative).
Summary of criteria for assessing the trade orientation of an agreement
Trade orientation Criteria—‘Trade coverage’ (x) versus ‘Balance of effects’ (y)
Neutrally oriented x ≈ y
Inwardly oriented x  |y|
Positive intra-group effect; y  0
Outwardly oriented x  |y|
Negative intra-group effect; y  0
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level of trade between members and non-
members (giving it a trade coverage ratio of
around 1.0). As the estimated increase in trade
between members was around one quarter
smaller than the increase in trade between
members and non-members (balance of effects
ratio of 0.73), the agreement is characterised as
strongly ‘outward oriented’.
It is interesting to contrast APEC, ASEAN,
the EEC and NAFTA. APEC is strongly
outward oriented with a very balanced amount
of trade within members and between
members and non-members. ASEAN is closer
to the boundary or inward/outward orientation
but has low coverage (0.15) and a balance of
effects slightly larger (0.29), which makes it
slightly inward oriented. Both EEC and
NAFTA are strongly inward oriented. The
EEC has huge coverage, covering most of the
trade area of EEC countries. NAFTA covers
about 40% of the trade of those countries.
These two agreements, along with APEC, are
the visible outliers on Figure 3 that have
extremely large coverage but very different
inward/outward orientation.
The results for each of the 27 agreements
are shown in Table 3.
9. Conclusion and Discussion
This article applies a gravity modelling
approach to undertake an analysis of the
impacts of a range of bilateral and regional
trade agreements with differing policy designs
and membership structures. The analysis
extends earlier studies by: adopting the Poisson
estimator to control for biases of other estima-
tors; explicitly controlling for the occurrence of
a large number of zero trade flows; implement-
ing a dummy variable approach to capture
asymmetric country fixed effects; and applying
a three-tiered dummy variable approach to
capture trade effects between agreement
members, fellow members and non-members.
Our analysis suggests that while participation
in BRTAs is likely to increase trade, the extent of
any changes depends on the nature of the agree-
ment. Preferential trade agreements are likely to
increase trade flows between partner countries
but at a cost to trade with other trading partners.
The estimates indicate that the balance of effects
can be negative. Non-preferential agreements
and agreements loosely implemented on an
‘open regionalism’ model, like the Asia-Pacific
ASEAN–CEPT and APEC agreements charac-
Figure 3 Trade Orientation of Selected Regional Agreements†
†US–Canada is included for comparison with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The dotted lines indi-
cate a ‘neutral’ focus.
Source: Gravity model estimates and authors’ calculations.
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teristically are associated with increased trade
between members and between members and
non-members. This approach has the potential to
provide broader-based reductions in barriers to
trade and deliver greater economic gains both
across member countries and globally. A greater
positive impact on trade between members is
also observed in the case of the European
Union’s customs union because of the nature of
the agreement and its large regional grouping.
Our main results and broad conclusions are
invariant to a range of sensitivity analyses:
estimation over different time periods and
subsamples; inclusion/exclusion of country-
pair observations for countries who never trade
during our sample period; and treatment of
differing reports of trade activity between
exporters and importers7.
It is important to bear in mind several
caveats. The most important is that trade
agreements may be endogenous in our model.
If trade agreements are implemented due to
increases in trade between partners in antici-
pation of increasing future trade that would
occur even in the absence of the agreement,
7. Details of sensitivity tests available on request from the
authors.
Table 3 Agreement Balance, Coverage and Orientation
Description Trade coverage ratio (x) Balance of effects ratio (y) Trade orientation
EFTA–Hungary 0.00 0.00 Neutral
Bolivia–Mexico 0.00 0.00 Neutral
Costa Rica–Mexico 0.00 0.01 Neutral
EEC–Egypt† 0.01 −0.33 Outward oriented
EFTA–Israel† 0.01 −0.28 Outward oriented
AU–PNG 0.01 −0.01 Inward oriented
Group of three 0.01 −0.01 Inward oriented
EFTA–Poland‡ 0.01 0.01 Neutral
Chile–Columbia 0.01 0.01 Neutral
MERCOSUR–Bolivia‡ 0.01 0.14 Inward oriented
EEC–Romania 0.01 23.32 Inward oriented
EEC–Poland 0.03 −2.23 Inward oriented
EFTA 0.03 0.02 Outward oriented
MERCOSUR–Chile 0.03 0.26 Inward oriented
ANZCERTA (CER) 0.04 −0.04 Inward oriented
Andean 0.04 0.45 Inward oriented
SPARTECA 0.06 −0.03 Inward oriented
CEFTA 0.06 0.11 Inward oriented
EEC–Swiss‡ 0.07 1.08 Inward oriented
CACM 0.08 0.03 Outward oriented
LAIA 0.09 0.29 Inward oriented
MERCOSUR 0.11 1.87 Inward oriented
ASEAN–CEPT 0.15 0.29 Inward oriented
US–Canada 0.22 1.09 Inward oriented
NAFTA 0.39 −2.91 Inward oriented
EEC 0.80 5.61 Inward oriented
APEC 1.00 0.73 Outward oriented
†Indicates agreements with an estimated decrease in intra-group trade. ‡Indicates agreements with an estimated decrease
in both intra- and extra-group trade.
Sources: Gravity model estimates, author calculations and UN Comtrade database.
ANZCERTA, Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Agreement; APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation; ASEAN,
Association of South-East Asian Nationals; CACM, Central American Common Market; CEFTA, Central European Free
Trade Agreement; CEPT, Common Effective Preferential Tariff; EEC, European Economic Community; EFTA, European
Free Trade Association; LAIA, the Latin American Integration Association; MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur;
NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement; PNG, Papua New Guinea; SPARTECA, South Pacific Regional Trade
and Economic Co-operation Agreement.
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then our results will overstate the effect of
trade agreements. Because we control for
country-specific effects through dummy vari-
ables, we are not able to say much about the
types of local country policies which aid or
hinder trade openness and the interaction
between domestic policies on the implementa-
tion of trade agreements. It would also be of
interest to control for the impact of the global
financial crisis and other factors effecting post-
2008 economic changes on country trading
patterns—a task beyond the scope of this
article and one that will probably have to wait
until a longer post-crisis dataset is available.
These would be fruitful areas for future
research.
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